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An Illustration of the Intersection of Social Science
and the Law: The Legal Rights of Adolescents to
Make Medical Decisions
Murray Levine,* Leah Wallach,**
David I. Levine,*** and Deborah Goldfarb****
ABSTRACT

The following are excerpts of Chapter 1: Social Science and
Psychological Influences in Law and Chapter 14: The Right of Adolescents
to Make Significant Medical Decisions—The Abortion Example from the
forthcoming textbook, Psychological Problems, Social Issues, and the
Law.1 The authors wrote the textbook, in part, to address the question:
“When law and psychology intersect, can and how do we fully consider the
potential ramifications of the social science beyond the confines of this one
case?”2 The editors of the Hastings Women’s Law Journal selected and
adapted the ensuing passages of the authors’ work as an illustration of
answering that question within a specific context. The passages from
Chapter 1, in Section I of this Article, demonstrate that while social science
and the law share characteristics and the law often relies on social science,
the two fields are almost innately at odds. The passages from Chapter 14,
in Sections II and III of this Article, exemplify how this dynamic plays out
in a controversial area of both law and social science. The original content
has not been changed but has been reformatted for law review publication
by Zachary Sanderson.†
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I.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES
IN LAW
A. LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: SIBLINGS OR DISTANTLY RELATED
COUSINS?

Understanding the extent to which law and social science can influence
one another requires that we understand the ways they overlap and differ.
Law and social science share some important characteristics. At a basic
level, both are concerned with human behavior. Both law and social
science change as society changes and as knowledge increases. However,
they differ in how they understand and absorb change.
Social scientists’ goal is new knowledge; they try to be skeptical,
exploratory, and open to changing ideas based on new information. In
psychology, conclusions and theories are subjected to criticism and
challenge through peer review and published criticism by other scientists.
Law’s movement is necessarily gradual. One of law’s functions is to ensure
social stability. The legal system has a role in maintaining a sense of
cultural identity and continuity while slowly incorporating cultural
innovation and changing values.
The contrast between law’s conservative nature and social science’s
willingness to experiment can be problematic when social science
professionals interact with courts. For social scientists and mental health
professionals, being wrong is part of the trial-and-error process of learning.
To judges and lawyers, this learning process may seem like unreliability.
Trial courts seek to find out the truth about past events that are the
subject of a specific dispute, then make a specific decision relatively
quickly with whatever knowledge they have. When the legal process
arrives at an erroneous conclusion, an injustice may be done. Justice Harry
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Blackmun once characterized the difference in these terms:
The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an
advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use,
however, in the project of reaching a quick, final and binding legal
judgment—often of great consequence—about a particular set of
events in the past.3
Second, law and psychology evaluate behavior differently.
Psychologists tend to see the behaviors, abilities, and responsibilities of
different people as a continuum and as varying in the same person with
different situations. They generally present conclusions in probabilistic
terms, not as absolutes. The legal system often requires that people or
behaviors be placed in distinct categories: insane or not, dangerous or not,
negligent or not, guilty or not.
Third, psychologists and judges may also approach issues differently at
the legislative (policy) level. These differences may lead to
misunderstandings between the two groups—and often disappointment for
social scientists who sometimes feel that courts do not give their work the
weight it deserves. One of the functions of social scientists is to empirically
test conventional assumptions about human nature. Policy makers are not
always interested in or willing to credit research questioning common sense
or community beliefs.4 They may feel it is a community’s right to
implement policies that reflect its deeply held beliefs.
Finally, judges have a complex job. Part of that job is to uphold or
express the symbols of society’s basic values.5 Even when they are
interested in empirical research bearing on a decision, data about the
assumptions or outcomes of a policy will comprise only one of their
considerations. Judges must consider legal rights and duties, the fairness of
procedures, the appropriate assignment of power and authority, and legal
precedent. Their reasoning determines the conclusions they draw from
research facts or whether they consider research at all.
B. LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
Today, psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists, sociologists,
anthropologists, and other social scientists participate both directly and
indirectly in all three branches of government and influence policy at every
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
4. See Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585
(1999).
5. See David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation. 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991).

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW

244

5/28/2019 11:30 AM

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:2

level.6 Clinical forensic (“belonging to courts of justice”)7 practice in
general, and subspecialties in criminal and family law, have expanded
greatly as well. Mental health professionals now contribute to the day-today administration of justice. They serve the courts as expert witnesses, and
provide psychological services to the police and correctional systems.
Family and juvenile courts work routinely with allied social service
agencies. Clinical, cognitive, developmental, and social psychologists do
the basic research on which expert opinion is grounded. Research by
cognitive and social psychologists into issues such as the reliability of
eyewitness testimony, false confession, juror biases, and juror decision
making also influences the trial process, directly through expert testimony,
and indirectly by suggesting ways judges and legislators may develop
better procedures. Social scientists and legal scholars now quickly examine
the legal implications of new developments in psychology and other social
sciences.

II.

THE RIGHT OF ADOLESCENTS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT
MEDICAL DECISIONS: THE ABORTION EXAMPLE

The abortion controversy is among the most intense policy debates in
contemporary society and presents an example of the interplay between law
and psychology. On one end of the debate are those who believe that
human life begins at the moment of conception. They say that a fetus of
any gestational age is entitled to the same legal protections as a newborn
child. To them, abortion is murder; for some, this is true even if the
procedure is done to save the mother’s life. On the other end of the debate
are those who believe that life begins at birth, and that women should have
the option of aborting a fetus as a matter of their autonomy. There are many
views in between these poles, as well.
Many states have promulgated laws affecting adolescents, and courts
have allowed greater limitations to be placed on adolescents than on adult
rights to privacy and choice. Adolescent pregnancy touches on critically
important and emotion-laden topics—adolescent sexuality, the meaning of
motherhood to a woman’s life, and the authority of families to make
decisions for their children.
A. ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY
The rates of pregnancies for teenagers in the United States vary greatly
from state to state and by race and ethnicity but generally decreased
between 2007 and 2015. In 2015, nationwide, about 229,715 females

6. See ANDREA SALTZMAN, DAVID M. FURMAN & KATHLEEN OHMAN, LAW
WORK PRACTICE (3rd ed., 2016).
7. Forensic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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between the ages of 15 and 19 became pregnant.8 In 2010, approximately
30 percent of pregnancies in girls age 15 to 19 ended in abortion.9 This is
part of a general trend in declining teenage abortion rates. The majority of
the pregnancies ended in live births (around 60 percent). Since 2004,
individuals have become more likely to obtain abortions via medication
rather than surgical methods.10
B. THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF MINORS
Parental consent. The U.S. Supreme Court has always been
ambivalent about granting full constitutional rights to minors, who are not
considered competent to make their own decisions in many areas.11 In a
series of rulings between 1976 and 2006, the Court affirmed that minors do
have a right to privacy in reproductive matters, but said their right is more
limited than that of adults.
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, the Court struck down
a provision in Missouri law requiring that all unmarried women under 18
obtain parental consent for an abortion.12 The Court said that the provision
gave too much power to a third party (the parent) to veto the adolescent’s
privacy right to decide on an abortion.13 However, in his opinion, Justice
Blackmun (the author of Roe)14 acknowledged that the state might have a
different interest in regulating the right of an immature minor than in
regulating the right of an adult woman.15 The comment invited states to
pass laws restricting the rights of minors. In subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court modified its original position, ruling that states could require parental
consent, provided the minor could obtain permission for the procedure
from a state court judge (a judicial bypass) without first going to her
parents.16
Parental notification. For a while, the Court distinguished between
parental consent and parental notification statutes. Distinguishing between
notification and consent implies that teens are essentially independent of
their parent’s influence when it comes to making a decision. Yet, can an
8. See Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2015, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP.,
Nov. 2017, at 1.
9. OFF. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., TRENDS IN TEEN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING
(2016).
10. HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET, MEDICATION ABORTION (June
2018), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/medication-abortion/ [https://p
erma.cc/TQ3V-BVPK].
11. See MURRAY LEVINE ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 4.
12. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, (1976).
13. Id.
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
15. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
16. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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adolescent act independently when her parents are aware of the decision
she wants to make?
In H.L. v. Matheson (1981), Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the
opinion upholding a statute requiring a physician to notify “if possible” the
parents of girls under 15, living at home, and not emancipated.17 He
reasoned that the state had a compelling interest in protecting immature and
dependent minors and in preserving family integrity.18 Chief Justice Burger
wrote that parental notification protected the child because the parents
could supply medical information and history to the physician that the
minor did not know.19 It did not matter if notice to the parent led to
pressure on the girl to forgo the abortion because the state could elect
policies to support childbirth rather than abortions, and notification was not
the same as the veto involved in a statute requiring consent.20
The chief justice saw no contradiction in the fact that, under most state
laws, a pregnant minor can consent to medical procedures related to
carrying a pregnancy and to childbirth. Citing some literature, he said
abortion was different because:
If the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical
decisions to be made entail few—perhaps none—of the potentially
grave emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to
abort.21
Melton and Pliner (1986) disputed whether the literature in fact supported
that contention.22
The H.L. v. Matheson (1981) opinion discussed the immature minor.
How is maturity to be determined? The courts and legislatures accept
simple chronological age as an adequate basis for determining competence
to drive, to purchase alcohol, and to consent to sexual relations. In the
abortion area, however, the Supreme Court refused to set a bright line of
age, calling for a case-by-case determination of maturity.23 The Court again
addressed the issue of determining maturity to obtain an abortion in
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (1983).24 In his opinion, Justice Lewis
Powell listed the requirements for a valid parental notification or consent
statute including the availability of a judicial bypass procedure:
17. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
18. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 412-413.
22. See GARY B. MELTON & A. J. PLINER, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis,
in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (Gary B. Melton ed. 1986).
23. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
24. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983).
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To protect her privacy right, the minor who does not wish to obtain
parental consent or does not want her parents to know must be
allowed to go to court directly.25
Once in court, the minor must demonstrate to the judge that she is
sufficiently mature to make the decision.26 If the minor demonstrates
maturity, the judge will waive the provisions for parental notification or
consent.27 Even if the judge finds the minor too immature to make the
decision, the judge may authorize an abortion without parental notification
or consent on the basis that this would be in the child’s best interests.28
Justice Powell set out some factors for the court hearing the minor’s
petition to consider: her emotional development, her maturity, her intellect
and understanding, her understanding of the consequences of an abortion
and of alternatives, and anything else the judge found pertinent to
consider.29 These were vague, but they offered at least some minimum
guidelines to judges and researchers.
Two-parent versus one-parent notification. In Hodgson v.
Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a Minnesota law requiring
that a minor notify both parents of her intent to have an abortion.30 The
statute is another example of a state law designed to test the limits of
restrictions on abortions. The legislature passed two versions of the bill,
one version without a judicial bypass provision and another version with
one.
The American Psychological Association submitted an amicus curiae
brief to the Supreme Court arguing that the two-parent notification statute
had harmful effects on minors.31 The brief reviewed research showing that
the two-parent notice requirement did not reestablish relationships with an
estranged parent, and could result in threats to renew custody disputes. It
could provoke violence or harassment in dysfunctional or abusive families.
Some adolescents who might have notified one parent went to court only to
avoid notifying the other one. The evidence at the trial opposing the
implementation of the law supported the conclusion that the statute did not
enhance communication with parents, and might well have impeded that
goal. In addition, Minnesota state court judges who administered the law
testified that they saw no good in it. The judges and other professionals
25. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 at 490.
26. Id. at 491.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 493.
30. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
31. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Inc., & The
Am. Jewish Comm. in Support of Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-1125).
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who worked with adolescents told the initial trial court that the procedure
was nerve-wracking for youth, and stimulated feelings of anger, shame,
guilt, and embarrassment.
The Supreme Court was deeply divided. Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote for a five-justice majority finding the two-parent notice without
judicial bypass unconstitutional.32 A different five-justice majority agreed
that the statute including a judicial bypass provision was constitutional.33
(Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote each time.) 34
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion upholding the two-parent
notification and 48-hour delay provisions with judicial bypass.35 Justice
Kennedy was unimpressed with the empirical evidence. In his view, the
values embodied in the statute were more important than assessing
empirically whether the statute was achieving its goal. He saw the
Minnesota law as a permissible, reasoned attempt to further the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting minors and protecting the parental role
without placing an absolute obstacle to abortion in an adolescent’s way.
Imperfections in the application of statutes are inevitable, he said. The
Court should defer to the state legislature’s wisdom in supporting a
“tradition of a parental role in the care and upbringing of children that is as
old as civilization itself.”36 Justice Kennedy reflected the opinion of a
strong majority of Americans who, in public opinion polls, support laws
requiring teenagers to obtain parental consent or notification before
obtaining an abortion.37
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was in the first five-justice majority,
entered a vigorous dissent to any two-parent notification provision, with or
without bypass.38 In support of his position, Justice Marshall cited research
findings extensively, including the APA brief and articles by Gary Melton
and by Catherine Lewis published in the American Psychologist.39
In 2006, the Supreme Court reviewed a law requiring that 48 hours
pass after parental notification before an abortion could take place.40 The
Court overturned the law as it lacked a medical emergency exception for
the woman’s health.41 In ruling, however, the Court quietly raised a
potential tension. Elsewhere in the textbook, we discuss research cited by
32. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 501.
37. Margaret Carlson, Abortion’s Hardest Cases, TIME, July 9, 1990 at 22.
38. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417.
39. See Gary Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79 (1987); see also Catherine Lewis, Minors’ Competence to Consent to
Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84 (1987).
40. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
41. Id.
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the APA in other amicus briefs (that the Supreme Court endorsed) finding
that adolescents are impulsive and, as such, should not be subjected to the
death penalty.42 Citing that research, the Ayotte Court thus stated that
parental notification laws are still important to help adolescents make
informed decisions.43 However, many people might argue that the research
in the APA brief seemed to contradict the Hodgson APA research that
minors can make competent decisions.44 Without explicitly noting it, the
Court raised an important question: How can the law and research reconcile
when children and adolescents can make good decisions and when do they
make bad decisions? And, can a coherent policy be formed around such
research studies? In this next section, we attempt to review some of this
research and at least pose the questions.

III. RESEARCH ISSUES RAISED BY THE COURT DECISIONS
Laws regulating adolescent access to abortion have sometimes played
out in unexpected ways. How adolescents make decisions; how family
members, judges, and lawyers who may represent adolescents in hearings
respond; and the availability of abortion services determine what the laws
mean in action.
A. MINORS’ COMPETENCE TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT ABORTION
Consent to health care must be informed; that is, the patient must have
“received adequate information about the risks associated with the
particular treatment and the alternatives that might be selected in place of
it.”45 The patient receiving the information must be able to use it
intelligently, to understand the information, and to draw inferences about
the probable implications of any proposed treatment for his or her future.
The law presumes that adults are competent to make decisions about
medical care, but that minors are not. In theory, giving the parent the
authority to consent for the minor helps make up for what the minor lacks
in experience, emotional maturity, or the ability to make a complex
judgment. The states recognize that many older minors do have the
competence to give consent to treatment in some areas. Many states also
recognize that minors may not seek treatment or may delay treatment for
conditions that, if known to the parents, might result in family conflict.

42. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 1.
43. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 320.
44. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009).
45. WALTER J. WADLINGTON, Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal
Framework, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCY TO CONSENT 57, 64 (G. B. Melton, G. P. Koocher,
& M. J. Saks eds., 1983).
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Depending on state law, minors under age 18 may seek treatment without
parental consent for substance abuse or addiction, family planning,
pregnancy care, venereal disease, and, sometimes, psychotherapy or
counseling. The question is when can adolescents competently make such
decisions.
Research on adolescent decision-making. Research suggests that
young people 15 and older are fairly competent cognitively to make general
health care decisions. They respond to questions about health care
dilemmas and use information in a manner not too different from adults.46
Ambuel and Rappaport studied adolescents who came to a woman’s
medical clinic for a pregnancy test.47 They found that minors under 15,
compared to older minors, were on average less able to answer questions
about the advantages and disadvantages of an abortion or of parenthood,
and about how a pregnancy or abortion might affect others in their lives.48
Minors over 15 had about the same knowledge and information as those
over 18.49 Ehrlich studied adolescents who had sought judicial bypasses.50
She reported that adolescents as young as 14 had fairly well thought
through, reasons for their choice and that most could state several cogent
reasons for seeking an abortion.51
Indeed, in a 2009 analysis, Steinberg and colleagues reconciled the
differences between decisions on adolescent criminal impulsivity and the
ability to make rational and informed medical choices.52 There they noted
that adolescents’ cognitive abilities generally reached an adult-level around
the age of 15 but that their psychosocial skills continued to develop
throughout adolescence and perhaps into early adulthood.53 Thus, the
scientists argued that medical decisions are different from the choice to
commit crime as the former is (though highly emotional) often made with
time allotted to think and frequently in conjunction with another adult
(even if not a parent).54 Under these circumstances, most adolescents are
arguably able to make adult-like decisions.
That being said, teens have unrealistic expectations about how their
46. See Catherine C Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538 (1981); see also Lois
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982).
47. See B. Ambuel & J. Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological
and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 129 (1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Choosing Abortion: Teens Who Make the Decision Without
Parental Involvement, GENDER ISSUES, Mar. 2003, at 3, 3.
51. Id.
52. Steinberg et al., supra note 44.
53. Id.
54. See Laurence Steinberg & Dustin Albert, Judgment and Decision Making in
Adolescence, 21 J. OF RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211 (2011).
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lives would be affected by carrying a child to term. Ninety-four percent
believe they could stay in school if they became pregnant, but only 70
percent of pregnant teens actually do stay.55 Fifty-one percent believe they
would marry the father of the child, but 81 percent of teen mothers are
unmarried.56
Examining the Research: Adolescent Decision-Making. Throughout
this book, we have looked at the research on adolescents’ abilities to make
careful decisions. In 2016, Cohen and an impressive group of colleagues
considered decisions made by 110 participants varying in age from 13 to
25.57 These decisions were made under either positive, negative, or neutral
emotional contexts.58
Younger adults revealed differences in their cognitive control from
older adults but only when they were negatively aroused.59 No such
differences were found in the positive or neutral conditions.60 This argues
for interventions that provide adolescents with support to ensure that they
are able to make choices without increased current stress or arousal.
Controversy about the use of research. Many psychologists have
debated the correct use of the research regarding adolescent competence
and decision-making. Is the research settled or clear enough to usefully
inform the courts and legislatures? Or, instead, are the scientists using their
research to motivate their desired policy outcomes? There are large risks in
the ways that science is perceived. Indeed, as noted by Steinberg and his
colleagues:
If APA’s statements about the state of scientific knowledge are
seen as advocacy masquerading as research, the integrity of the
Association’s scientific mission is threatened.61
The debate regarding whether the science is ready has been ongoing for
some time. In the early 1980s, some psychologists argued that, based on
intellectual competence alone as demonstrated in developmental studies, there
was little basis for limiting the right of older adolescents to participate in
medical decisions.62 They maintain that the research, though imperfect, was
55. SIECUS REP., Feb.-Mar. 2002, at 1, 1.
56. Id.
57. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive
Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549, 550 (2016).
58. Id. at 551.
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id.
61. Steinberg et al., supra note 45, at 583.
62. See Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy
as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Gary B. Melton,
Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. OF FAM. L. 445 (1984);
Gary B. Melton & Nancy F. Russo, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological Perspectives on
Public Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 69 (1987).
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well enough developed to provide useful information to judges who need to
make immediate decisions in the cases before them.63 The APA agreed with
this position and presented the work in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme
Court in Hartigan v. Zbaraz and Charles, Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and Hodgson v. Minnesota.64
Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, however, believed that the APA’s use of
the studies on adolescent competence in a legal forum was inappropriate.65
They argued that the research was too sparse, the methods oversimplified,
and the conclusions not well enough accepted in the scientific community
to warrant confident assertions in a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.66 The
debate thus still continues about when the database is sufficient to warrant
an amicus brief and when it is sufficient to support a policy preference.
When and how do we decide the science is ready for judges and legislators
to rely upon it with confidence?
B. EFFECTS OF PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AND CONSENT STATUTES
Parental notification or consent statutes are intended to protect the
minor from unwise decisions, and to promote the integrity of the family
and the authority of the parent. No law prohibits adolescents from
informing their parents. The laws permit adolescents to avoid notifying
parents if the adolescent so chooses by going to court. The statutes present
an important opportunity to see how a law shapes human behavior, and
how people adapt to a law when vital interests are at stake.
Did adolescents notify parents before they had to? Clary studied 141
adolescents who had requested abortion services at a clinic in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area in 1979, before Minnesota implemented its law
requiring parental notification.67 Most studies found that around half of
minors voluntarily involved one or both of their parents, even if the
hospital or abortion clinic had no policy requiring parental consent or
notification.68 Younger minors, perhaps because of greater financial and
emotional dependence, were more likely to inform their parents than older

63. Id.
64. See Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987); Thornburgh v. American Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990).
65. See William Gardner, David Scherer, & Maya Tester, Asserting Scientific Authority:
Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 885 (1989).
66. Id.
67. See Freddie Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental
Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 283 (1982).
68. See Clary, supra note 67; see V. G. Cartoof & L. V. Klerman, Parental Consent for
Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 397 (1986); see also
Catherine Lewis, Minors’ Competence to Consent to Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84
(1987).
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minors.69
Smith found that most adolescents who confided in their parents felt
the experience increased communication and brought them closer
together.70 However, those who expected their parents would have a
negative reaction were less likely to inform them of the pregnancy in the
first place.71 About a third of those who did not tell their parents believed
that, if they had, their parents would have punished them or prevented them
from having the abortion Some young women said they feared upsetting
their parents or making them feel bad.72
After parental notification: Advise, consent, or coerce. Ehrlich
found that adolescents under 18 who sought judicial waivers under the law
in Massachusetts expressed many of the same concerns as adolescents prior
to notification laws being enacted (that parents would try to convince them
not to obtain the procedure).73 In addition to concerns about physical abuse,
many feared their parents would lose respect for them or lose trust.74 Many
who sought the waivers said that they had had little communication with
their parents about sex and that communication now would be very
difficult.75
Adolescents who want an abortion and fear their parents will oppose
their wishes can try to obtain the abortion by getting court permission or by
seeking the abortion in another state without parental notification or
consent laws. If the state’s consent or notification law is to be upheld as
constitutional, adolescents must have the option of seeking a court waiver
without notifying their parents. Adolescents who want to have the baby do
not need their parents’ permission under the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings.
With whom do adolescents consult? Almost half of adolescents who
wish to obtain an abortion notify an adult who is neither their parent nor a
medical professional.76 Adolescents are also likely to share problems with
friends than with parents or professionals.77 Seventy-one percent of
adolescents seeking an abortion in Cartoof and Klerman’s sample told their
best friend, and about 90 percent told their boyfriends.78 Ehrlich reported
similar findings based on a large sample of adolescents who sought a

69. Id.
70. Elizabeth M. Smith, A Follow-up Study of Women Who Request Abortion, 43 AM. J.
OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 574, 581 (1973).
71. Id. at 583.
72. Id.
73. Ehrlich, supra note 51.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Kathryn Kost & Stanley Henshaw, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion
Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196 (1992).
77. Id.
78. V. G. Cartoof & L. V. Klerman, Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of the
Massachusetts Law, 76 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 397 (1986).
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judicial bypass waiver in Massachusetts.79
We do not know exactly what teenage friends have to offer by way of
sage counsel or practical advice to a pregnant adolescent.80 Research has
shown that the presence of peers can induce adolescents to make more
risky decisions.81 However, most of this research has focused on emotional
or impulsive decisions, which, as we discussed earlier, have been argued to
be different for adolescents than situations where cognition is the driving
factor.
C. HOW ADOLESCENTS ADAPT TO THE LAW
Researchers have investigated the effects of parental notification laws
in Massachusetts and Minnesota, and there are some data from other states
as well.
The judicial bypass option. Before parental notification or consent
laws took effect, 33 percent to 50 percent of minors seeking an abortion
informed their parents.82 Mnookin estimated that, after Massachusetts
instituted a parental consent requirement with judicial bypass in 1981,
about 75 percent of minors seeking abortions in the state obtained parental
consent, and about 25 percent sought judicial bypass.83 However, a
significant number of young women obtained abortions in neighboring
states without those restrictions to avoid both the consent provision and a
court hearing.84 If we take into account adolescents who went out of state,
after the law went into effect, only about 42 percent of Massachusetts
minors getting abortions were notifying their parents.
Blum, Resnick, and Stark studied the impact of the Minnesota law that
required minors to notify both parents or seek a judicial bypass.85 They
concluded that the law probably resulted in more adolescents telling their
parents about their pregnancy.86 However, about 43 percent of minors
seeking abortions used the court bypass.87 About a quarter of these minors
had notified one parent, but did not want to notify the other.88 Most of the

79. Ehrlich, supra note 50.
80. Lewis, supra note 39.
81. See Laurence Steinberg et al., The Teenage Brain: Peer Influences on Adolescent
Decision Making, 22(2) CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 114 (2013).
82. See ROBERT HARRIS MNOOKIN, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in THE INTEREST OF
CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (Robert Harris Mnookin ed.,
1985).
83. Id.
84. Cartoof & Klerman, supra note 79.
85. R. W. Blum, M. D. Resnick, & T. Stark, Factors Associated with the Use of Court
Bypass by Minors to Obtain Abortion, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158 (1990).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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group that went to court was over 16 (85 percent), and the majority came
from economically better-off families.89
The judicial waiver provisions of state laws on parental notification or
consent, a constitutional requirement, provide good examples of the
difference between the law on the books and the law in action.90 In
Massachusetts, the judicial waiver worked reasonably smoothly, although
the adolescents who went through the procedure found it stressful and
embarrassing.91 Other states also have such laws, but the mechanics were
such that there were obstacles to using the court, especially if the judge
reviewing the petition personally opposed abortion.92
Silverstein et al. studied how well the Tennessee parental consent law
operated. In theory, the law had several provisions that should make it
easier for adolescents to access the judicial bypass option (e.g., a statesupported advocate, court-appointed counsel to assist the adolescent, and
courts with jurisdiction conveniently located in each county). The research
team called each county’s court, saying, “I am calling to find out how a girl
who is not eighteen who wants an abortion can get a judge’s permission to
avoid telling her parents.”93
If the respondent in the court referred the caller to someone else, the
research team pursued that call to see where it led. The research team
measured “preparedness” by noting whether or not the court personnel
acknowledged their obligation to conduct waiver hearings and mentioned
the availability of legal counsel or an advocate. Based on the telephone
inquiry, they classified 45 of Tennessee’s 95 county courts (47 percent) as
being unprepared to handle inquiries. Many of the courts simply
recommended contacting an attorney, a social service agency, or an
abortion clinic. Eight informants in the 45 unprepared courts expressed
doubts that a judge could waive parental consent, although state law
explicitly gives judges that authority.94
Most of the court advocates designated by the Department of Social
Services to work with minors on the petitions were prepared to do so.
However, it took repeated telephone calls to contact many of the advocates.
Adolescents would not or could not leave home numbers to receive
callbacks from advocates. They feared their parents would learn what they
wanted to do. For many adolescents, these administrative flaws made the
waiver procedure accessible only with difficulty. Similar problems were

89. Blum et al., supra note 85.
90. Ehrlich, supra note 50.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 31.
93. See Helena Silverstein et al., Easier Said than Done: Tennessee’s Efforts to
Implement Mandated Parental Consent for Abortion and the Judicial Waiver Process, 27 L.
& POL’Y 399, 405-407 (2005).
94. Id. at 407-412.
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reported in Alabama and Pennsylvania.95
What happens when adolescents go to court? In those states for
which we have data, judges almost never reject the petitions of minors
seeking abortions. From 1981 to 1983, about 1,300 Massachusetts minors
sought judicial authorization for an abortion. The hearings were short. The
judges found the minor was “mature” in about 90 percent of the cases.
When the minor was not mature, the judge was required to consider her
“best interests.” The Massachusetts judges found that an abortion was in
the minor’s best interests in all but five cases. All five managed to obtain
abortions, one by going to another judge, three through an appeal, and one
by going out of state.96 Ehrlich, working with Massachusetts adolescents in
subsequent years, reported similar rates of judges allowing minors to obtain
abortions. Though judges in Massachusetts almost always granted the
petition, the young women who went to court experienced it as aversive
and punitive.97 Many were embarrassed and angered by the experience.
Going to court in and of itself invaded adolescent privacy.98 Judges asked
the young women intimate questions about their sex lives, their menstrual
cycles (to determine how advanced the pregnancy was), about abortions,
about how they made their decision, and sometimes about their relationship
with their parents.99 Young petitioners were also afraid they might see
someone they knew in the courthouse building.100
In Minnesota, petitions were usually granted after a hearing lasting an
average of 15 minutes (see Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hodgson v.
Minnesota). However, the judicial bypass procedure was burdensome.101 In
addition to delays arising from court schedules, judges who had
conscientious objections to abortion refused to hear the petitions.102 Minors
sometimes had to travel as much as 500 miles to get a hearing.103
Undertaking a journey of that distance in itself sometimes compromised a
teenager’s privacy.104 None of the groups involved in judicial bypass
thought the procedure was satisfactory.105 The young women who went to
court were angry and resentful at having to report intimate details of their
lives to strangers, and many reported feeling anxious and guilty in court as

95. Id. at 412-415.
96. MNOOKIN, supra note 82.
97. Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 12-19.
98. Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 30-31; see also Gary Melton, Legal Regulation of
Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79 (1987).
99. Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 30-31.
100. Id.
101. See Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court
Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 260-261 (1983).
102. Id. at 264.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 266-267.
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well.106 Judges did not see the point of the proceeding; if the young woman
was mature, she could have an abortion as she wished.107 If they found that
she was not mature enough to make her own decision, how could they
decide she was mature enough to bear a child? Lawyers assigned to aid the
petitioning minors also disliked the task.108 They received no fee or were
paid low fees by the state and not very promptly.109
While judges in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Michigan tend to
rubber-stamp petitions by minors, this may not be the case in other states.
There are very little systematic data for other states. When judicial
approval of petitions is more difficult to obtain, one can hypothesize that
more pregnant minors will inform their parents or go out of the state if they
can to avoid the requirement. Virginia’s bypass statute gives the judge
discretion to inform the adolescent’s parent or parents. There are no data on
the effect of this Virginia law. The District of Columbia, which borders
Virginia, has no parental consent or notification law. However, the District
of Columbia has the highest number of teenage abortions in the country.
Some of the adolescents who had abortions in the District of Columbia
came from neighboring Virginia. In Texas, adolescents advised by lawyers
or counselors may go “judge shopping.”110 For example, two counties with
judges with anti-abortion reputations had 19 and 13 cases respectively.111
Two adjacent counties handled 191 and 110 cases respectively.112
Delay in seeking abortion. Abortions are riskier and more costly as a
pregnancy progresses. Because the period between the first suspicions that
they are pregnant and the decision about what to do is the most stressful for
women, delay also increases stress and anxiety. Most abortions take place
within the first 12 weeks of gestation. However, adolescents, especially
younger ones, more than older women, delay seeking an abortion. Concern
about their parents’ reactions and reluctance to go to court may be among
the reasons adolescents delay seeking an abortion, to their detriment. In
Texas, following a parental notification law, fewer minors became
pregnant, but minors who were pregnant and were within six months of
reaching their eighteenth birthday showed an increased likelihood of
obtaining a delayed (and more complicated) second trimester abortion.113

106. Donovan, supra note 101, at 267.
107. Id.
108. MNOOKIN, supra note 82 at 516; Donovan, supra note 101 at 265.
109. MNOOKIN, supra note 82, at 54; Donovan, supra note 101, at 268.
110. Janet Elliott, Abortion Detour: Girls Looking to Bypass Parental Notice Avoid Harris
County Courts, HOUS. CHRON., (Mar. 24, 2002), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-tex
as/article/Girls-turning-to-liberal-courts-to-avoid-parental-2068391.php [https://perma.cc/U
K4G-68T2].
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Theodore Joyce et al., Changes in Abortions and Births and the Texas Parental
Notification Law, 354 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 1011 (2006).
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There seems to be a general trend to delay seeking an abortion among
women in those states with laws that require a waiting period or a return for
a second consultation, as approved in Casey.114 In Mississippi, the
proportion of second-trimester abortions increased from 7.5 percent of
abortions to 11.5 percent among women who relied on providers within the
state.115 The rate increased somewhat less among those able to seek
abortions in nearby states that did not have a law requiring delay.116
Does parental notification reduce the number of abortions? Pro-life
advocates hoped that parental notification and consent statutes would
reduce the number of abortions, but the law did not appear to have that
effect in Massachusetts.117 Cartoof and Klerman (1986) used the
Massachusetts Department of Health database to examine changes month
by month in the number of adolescents who obtained abortions within the
state, and also obtained data on the number of minors who obtained
abortions in five neighboring states that at that time did not have parental
consent or notification requirements.118 The number of women under 17
having abortions in Massachusetts went down about 43 percent the year the
notification requirement was implemented.119 However, the number of
Massachusetts minors seeking abortions in neighboring states went from an
average of 29 a month to an average of 95 a month.120 The researchers
concluded that the law had done very little, if anything, to reduce the
number of abortions among Massachusetts adolescents.121 In Texas, the
number of abortions obtained by teenagers did decline following passage of
a parental notification law, but it is difficult to attribute the decline to the
operation of the law alone.122 The number of abortions has been declining
nationally for several years now; some believe that it is due to increased
access to healthcare and/or increased education rather than restrictions on
access to abortion.

IV. SUMMARY
Adolescents’ ability to make informed medical decisions for
themselves is an area of both empirical and legal debate. Perhaps no other
medical decision has been more litigated than the right of adolescents to
decide to have an abortion. For most of our nation’s history, abortion was
114. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. See Theodore Joyce & Robert Kaestner, The Impact of Mississippi’s Mandatory
Delay Law on the Timing of Abortion, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4 (2000).
116. Id.
117. Cartoof & Klerman, supra note 78, at 400; MNOOKIN, supra note 83, at 149.
118. Cartoof & Klerman, supra note 78, at 397.
119. Id. at 398.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 400.
122. Joyce et al., supra note 113, at 1036-1038.
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the province of state governments. In the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court developed a constitutional right to privacy that it extended first to the
use of contraception and then, in Roe v. Wade, to abortion.123 By making
the right to get an abortion part of a constitutionally protected right to
privacy in reproductive matters, the decision limited the power of the states
to prohibit abortion. After Roe v. Wade, a growing right-to-life movement
worked toward the passage of state laws regulating abortion in ways that
would be likely to discourage women from terminating their pregnancies.
Some of the restrictions survived challenges brought to the Supreme Court,
but the Court refused to overturn the basic ruling that abortion could not be
banned.124
The abortion story is far from over, and social science and
psychological studies will continue to play a part in the debate. The social
science community will be divided about when the research base is
sufficiently strong to be a basis for policy recommendations. For example,
more work is needed to reconcile the research showing that adolescents are
more likely to make risky choices than adults with research showing that
adolescents can make rational and capable decisions. The one thing of
which we can be confident is that activists of all points of view will use
social science and psychological studies to try to persuade the public to
support their causes. As a result, research may well have both direct and
indirect effects on legislative debates and judicial decision making.

123. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
124. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52; Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398; Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. at 416; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 476; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417; Ayotte, 546 U.S. at
320; Hartigan, 484 U.S. at 171; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW

260

5/28/2019 11:30 AM

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

***

[Vol. 30:2

